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Abstract
NGO certication is a prerequisite for corporate engagement in enhanced social
behaviors in many settings. Labels with broad scope (like `sustainability') coexist
with niche competitors much narrower in scope (like `bird-friendliness'). When NGOs
compete for adoptions the wrong suite of schemes emerges, providing a rationale for
regulation. An incumbent NGO may strategically narrow the breadth of its label
to deter entry of competing schemes, reducing welfare. Even when entry is accom-
modated, welfare is compromised. Modeling multi-issue competition between NGOs
allows us to be the rst to analyze label fragmentation and provide a novel perspective
on proliferation that has frustrated practitioners.
Keywords: NGO certication, eco-label, label design, corporate social responsibility.
JEL Classication Numbers: L31, D82, D20.
1 Introduction
In many settings a rm is more protable if it is seen to behave in a socially responsible way.
Some consumers may be willing to pay a premium for its product, a worker might be willing
to work for a lower wage, a regulator might be less likely to subject it to the burdens of
audit, and so on (e.g., Baron, 2011; Winston, 2015). While this gives prot-motivated rms
an instrumental incentive to bundle their products with pro-social behaviors|to engage
in what Besley and Ghatak (2007) have called `retailing public goods'|they often nd it
dicult to communicate credibly such behavior to outsiders. A rm may say that it behaves
well, but why should people believe it?
To overcome this information gap rms typically rely on credible non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) as certiers, such that NGO run labeling schemes are now common in
the retail landscape.1 The relationship between rms and their certiers is symbiotic. An
NGO willing to certify a behavior is fundamental for a prot-motivated rm to be willing to
engage in it, but equally NGOs that want to achieve impact (Duncan, 2004; Scharf, 2014)
rely on their labels being adopted by rms. The social engagement behaviors of rms both
inuence, and are inuenced by, the design of labeling schemes.
Motivated by the real world social labeling context, we develop the rst model in which
competing NGOs design and operate labeling schemes in a horizontal setting in which
schemes can vary in the breadth of behaviors to which they relate.
The scope of a labeling scheme|whether it applies to a wide set of behaviors, or a nar-
rower niche behavior|is a crucial design dimension along which NGOs compete for adoption
1For instance, the website ecolabelindex.com currently catalogs 463 eco-label schemes. Some com-
mentators remark that `today there is a Babylon of labeling going on. . . it's estimated that there are
literally thousands of labels in the world today' (Green, 2011, p. 4). In terms of value 16 of the
largest producer oriented eco-labeling initiatives in the agricultural sector account for about 36.1 bil-
lion US (2012) dollars of product and adoption of these labels is growing rapidly (Potts et al., 2014,
p. 27). Sales of certied coee and tea grew by 433 and 2000 percent respectively from 2005
to 2010 (Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of Standards and Certication, 2012,
p. 9). NGOs are the largest provider of eco-labels, though there are also industry run labels
(Vermeer and Michalko, 2010, p. 21). There is a separate and important question as to how NGOs themselves
build and maintain a credible reputation for honesty which we ignore.
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Figure 1: Example of a narrow and a wide label.
of their label to produce social impact. The resulting issue of fragmentation in NGO certi-
cation is one that has been much-debated in practitioner circles. Readers will be familiar
with a variety of wide labels that attest to very broad things such as `sustainability' and
`fair-trade', embodying multiple dimensions of behavior, as well as much more narrowly fo-
cused schemes. To illustrate concretely what we have in mind, consider the two labels in
Figure 1. On the left side is an example of a narrow label (the Smithsonian label that attests
to a product having been made in a bird-friendly way), on the right a wide label (the WFEN
label says a product has been made in a way friendly to wildlife in general, including birds).
Our purpose in this paper is twofold. First, we analyze the decision of an NGO in
designing a labeling scheme in a setting characterized by horizontally dierentiated social
issues, with particular focus on the width of the label|the set of behaviors that a label covers.
Second, we examine the welfare implications of entry and competition between NGOs in the
quasi-market for labeling services.
The question of `what issues get labeled?' is an obvious one but it has been ignored by
existing research.2 While the answer is interesting from the point of view of a positive theory
2Every existing paper starts with a pre-determined issue to which a label applies. Most then concentrate
on the stringency of the label (e.g., Fischer and Lyon, 2014; Li and v'ant Veld, 2015). The only exception to
this is Heyes and Martin (2017) who model some aspects of label performance on a Salop-style circular issue-
space. Individual labels in that paper, however, remain single-issue so there is no concept of label width, the
focus here. Outside of the literature on label design, there is a literature on quality certication for multi-
attribute experience goods (e.g., Dranove and Jin, 2010; Sun, 2011; Bar-Isaac et al., 2012; Ma and Mak,
2014). In these papers, focus lies on the response of a monopolist to information disclosure and consumer
learning about the quality of a product when such quality can vary over two dimensions. The model we
consider is distinct for two reasons. First, we x the `quality' of rms' behavior with respect to social issues:
a rm can either behave well or behave poorly for a given social issue. This allows us to focus on the scope
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of labels, the relationship between scope and eectiveness of labels is the more compelling
normative question. In particular, what is the eect of competition between NGOs on the
ecacy of a particular labeling scheme, and on the social desirability of the portfolio of
labeling schemes that emerge in equilibrium? From a policy perspective, any inability of
NGOs to deliver an optimal suite of labeling schemes provides a rationale for regulation of
third sector labeling activities.
In examining competition between NGOs over the set of issues addressed by a label, this
paper provides a novel perspective on label design and competition between NGO-operated
labeling schemes. A major advantage of recognizing the horizontal nature of labels and com-
petition between and entry of NGOs is that questions of label proliferation and fragmentation
can be explored.3 Discussion of proliferation makes no sense in a model without entry, and
fragmentation has no meaning in a setting without a horizontal dimension. We show that
competition between NGOs generally has a negative eect on the eciency of labels in the
economy. In the presence of competition|or even just the threat of competition|NGOs
bring to market the wrong (inecient) suite of labeling schemes. This results from the inter-
play of strategic entry and design choices by competing NGOs.4 From a policy perspective,
this result implies that erecting barriers to entry for new certiers will generally improve
of labels rather than their stringency, the focus of existing literature on label design. Put dierently, we
focus on horizontal rather than vertical characteristics of the label in a multi-attribute setting. Second, we
use our model to analyze the types of labels that competing certiers design, rather than how rms respond
to certication and consumer learning. While this is an important aspect of certication in a multi-attribute
setting, we consider a simple model of rm behavior to focus our analysis on NGOs. Since social attributes
are rightfully a credence characteristic of a good, rather than an experiential characteristic, the interaction
with quality and rms' pricing strategies is less interesting for the case of social attributes.
3Label proliferation refers to an increase in the number of labeling scheme (that is, en-
try). Fragmentation refers to the case where a single broad behavior, say, sustainabil-
ity or environmental responsibility, is decomposed for into a number of narrower sub-behaviors
(Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of Standards and Certication, 2012, p. 51).
4To the best of our knowledge this is also the rst paper (with the exception of Heyes and Martin (2017))
to allow for entry by NGOs into the labeling arena and discuss label proliferation in a formal model of
labeling. By contrast, the model of Heyes and Martin examines the implications of entry of competing
scheme on the stringency of labels. The conceptual dierence between their model and ours is that we
examine the implications of proliferation on the scope of labels, abstracting from stringency. Importance
of the interaction between scope of labels and entry is discussed in Auld (2014). Compared to Heyes and
Martin, entry of schemes leads to ineciency in the equilibrium set of labels through its interaction with
scope, rather than improving welfare by aecting stringency.
3
welfare.
1.1 Contestability in the Market for Certication: An Illustrative
Worked Example
The basic mechanism that underpins our results is worth understanding right from the start,
and arises from the potential that an NGO might wish to leverage rms by `bundling' into
broad labeling criteria issues that the rm does not necessarily nd protable to address
individually, thus inducing the rm to address a broader range of social issues than it would
with a narrow label alone.
Despite our reference to the bundling of issues, any resemblance to the IO literature
on the bundling of consumer goods (e.g., McAfee et al., 1989; Nalebu, 2004) is supercial.
Not only are the settings, players and objectives distinct, but the insights are quite dierent.
Central to that literature is that bundling can be used as a form of price discrimination,
which has no analogue here. In terms of bundling and entry, in the pioneering work of
Nalebu (2004) an incumbent may have an incentive to bundle goods in order to deter entry
by single-product competitors. In the current paper, the player facing entry (in this case
an NGO) is under pressure to narrow or `unbundle' its oering to discourage entry. Much
better analogies to the mechanism at play in our model are the notions of contestability
and vulnerability to hit-and-run entry (Baumol et al., 1982), and regulatory `dealing' by
enforcement agencies (Heyes and Rickman, 1999).
For concreteness, consider the following stylized example. Suppose that a rm gets an
increase in prot (gross of any outlays required to qualify for the label) equal to $10m if
it carries a label saying that it is bird-friendly and can separately attract another increase
equal to $10m if it is certied elephant-friendly. Further assume that adjusting its production
practices to be bird-friendly would cost the rm $5m, while to be elephant-friendly would
cost it $12m, and that there are no economies or dis-economies of scope between the required
adjustments.
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If there exists only one certifying NGO that oers a wide label requiring both bird- and
elephant-friendliness for award, the rm would adjust practices on both dimensions in order
to qualify for the label, gaining $20m - $17m = $3m in prot. If we allow for entry of
another certifying NGO, however, the competing NGO could introduce a narrow scheme
that requires only bird-friendliness and the rm that we have described would opt out of the
wide scheme and into the competing label for a gain of $10m - $5m = $5m > $3m.
Though the welfare impacts of certication are going to require some additional structure,
we can observe immediately that in making such a switch the overall wildlife-friendliness of
the rm is diminished. Of course the equation could be complicated if we account (as
we do below) for the possibility that rms to vary in how costly they nd adherence to
each of multiple labeling requirement and there are economies or dis-economies of scope
between dierentiated pro-social behaviors, and for the costs associated with the operation
of labeling schemes, but the example illustrates the potential for deleterious eects from label
entry when labels compete in scope. The motivation for the entrant NGO in the model is
the assumption|well-established in the literature|that they attach greater weight to social
impact associated with their own program than the programs of other NGOs.
Through the process described above, niche labels can attract defectors from wide labels.
Provided economies of scope for rms in addressing the diverse set of issues are not too
large, the market for labels is contestable and an entering NGO can have its label adopted
by rms that, pre-entry, were being leveraged. However, a forward-looking incumbent NGO
will anticipate the possibility of entry when it designs its labeling scheme and may adjust the
scheme it puts in place. Depending on the distribution of rm costs, and certain other aspects
of the setting, an incumbent NGO may choose to deter entry by oering an ineciently
narrow label.5 Or it might accommodate entry, continuing to oer a wide label but facing
reduced adoption of its label as potential adopters are drawn to the narrow competitor. Only
5Note that this is the opposite of the entry deterrence result when rms can bundle products to consumers
as a form of entry deterrence (Nalebu, 2004; Peitz, 2008). Bundling issues into its label makes an incumbent
NGO more susceptible to competition from an entrant because of leveraged rms, and the incumbent would
like to un-bundle its label to deter entry.
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when entry is blockaded will NGOs produce an ecient set of labels, as an incumbent is able
to oer a wide label without fear of competitive forces. The key result from the model is
that when NGOs design the scope of their label strategically, competition|or even just the
threat of competition|causes NGOs to design labels that are not ecient.
While the above results hold for a wide range of parameter values, with sucient economies
of scope entry is always blockaded and an incumbent NGO oers a label that is wide in scope
and socially-ecient. With sucient dis-economies of scope, an incumbent NGO may ei-
ther accommodate or deter entry by competing label schemes, though here deterrence or
accommodation may be welfare-enhancing.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents the core model; section
3 examines competition between NGOs; section 4 concludes. Proofs are in the appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Labeling
Let I be a set of social issues or behaviors (e.g., `bird-friendliness' ) on which the behavior
of a rm can be categorized as either `good' or `bad'. To make matters simple, we consider
only two issues so that I = fissue 1; issue 2g.
A social label, denoted by L, certies that the behavior of a rm is good with respect to
a subset of the issues in I. For example, to qualify for label L = fissue 1g the behavior of a
rm on issue 1 must be `good'. To streamline notation, let L1 = fissue 1g, L2 = fissue 2g,
and L12 = fissue 1; issue 2g. We refer to L1 and L2 as `narrow' labels, and L12 as `wide' to
keep the notion of scope in mind.6 The set of labels available is denoted by L.
Associated with each label L is some external benet B(L) that accrues from addressing
6That the wide label is a subset of the narrow label is a consequence of I having only two issues. While
it is straightforward to extend our model to allow for more than two issues|and generate equilibria where
a narrow label is not a subset of the wide label|the model becomes considerably more complicated. We
restrict attention to an issue space with only two issues for simplicity. Importantly, our results are not
sensitive to this assumption.
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the social issue(s) to which the label relates, such that
B(L) =
8>><>>:
b if L = L1 or L = L2;
2b if L = L12:
Generally, this benet comes from mitigating an externality. If, for example, a label requires
that the practices of a rm be carbon-neutral, then the external benet from adherence
might be enumerated by combining a measure of the volume of emissions that would have
resulted from business as usual with an estimate of the social cost of carbon.
The assumption that B(L1) = B(L2) emphasizes the horizontal nature of issues; one
issue is not objectively `more important' than the other. The assumption that B(L12) =
B(L1) +B(L2) implies that issues are distinct; dealing with issue 1 does not render dealing
with issue 2 any more or less socially valuable. Being nice to birds does not change the value
society places on being nice to elephants. This separability keeps the analysis simple while
emphasizing the fundamental points.
2.2 Consumers and Firms
In order to focus on the label design problem, we adopt as simple an industry structure
as possible. Specically, assume there is a collection of rms that each sell one unit of
output in a global market and can engage in pro-social behavior by adopting `good' behavior
with respect to the social issues in I. Consumers inelastically demand one unit of output
and have preferences for a rm's social conduct.7 Given the credence nature of pro-social
behavior, such behavior is only credible in the eyes of consumers if it is externally certied
(i.e., labeled). A (representative) consumer's willingness to pay for a good that bears a label
7This setup follows that of Heyes and Maxwell (2004) and Fischer and Lyon (2014), and is similar to that
in Bottega and De Freitas (2009).
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L is denoted by (L), where
(L) =
8>><>>:
 if L = L1 or L = L2;
2 if L = L12:
As with external benets, willingness to pay for a labeled good is assumed separable. This
has the sensible implication that consumers' valuation of pro-social behavior is proportional
to its social impact.
Bearing the label L on its product allows a rm to extract consumers' willingness to
pay for pro-social behavior, generating an increase in prot for the rm of (L)|which
is understood to be gross of the costs associated with label adoption. The term (L) is
the increase in the price the rm can charge when bearing label L on its product. It is
important to note that this increase in prot comes about from a rm addressing social
issues and credibly communicating this behavior to consumers, not from the label itself; if
a rm adopts two labels that cover the same issue, they do not get twice as much prot as
if they had only adopted one label. Since labeling is voluntary, a rm can always choose to
not adopt any label and forgo a price premium for its product. Following existing literature
on label design (e.g., Fischer and Lyon, 2014; Li and v'ant Veld, 2015; Heyes and Martin,
2017), our assumptions allows us to ignore the implication of labels for competing rms'
strategies and instead focus on NGOs' strategies.8
While we frame protability from adopting a label as coming from a rm extracting
consumers' willingness to pay for pro-social behavior, this is not the only mechanism by
which a rm can be rewarded for adopting a label. More generally, a label can increase
protability by allowing a rm to credibly communicate its good behavior to stakeholders.
For example, by adopting a label and credibly signaling its improved social conduct, a rm
8See Amacher et al. (2004) for a model that focuses on rms' strategies when they can adopt eco-labels.
The assumption that prot from a label does not depend on other rms' label-adoption decisions amounts to
a restriction on industry structure, such as perfect competition (Li and v'ant Veld, 2015), Bertrand competi-
tion (Heyes and Martin, 2017), or no competition at all (Heyes and Maxwell, 2004; Bottega and De Freitas,
2009; Fischer and Lyon, 2014).
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may be able to avoid a costly boycott by a social activist; in this case, the increase in prot
from a label comes from a reduction in expected costs from avoiding the activist's campaign.
Although we stick with a model in which a rm is rewarded by consumers, noting prevents us
from interpreting our model in a broader setting in which rms are rewarded by stakeholder
more generally. Essential for us is that a rm receives a boost in prot from engaging in
pro-social behavior, and certication by a third party NGO is required for a rm to harvest
this reward.9
Firms vary in their cost of engaging in pro-social behavior with respect to a particular
issue. The cost of good behavior on a particular issue can be either ch or cl (high or low),
with ch > cl. Since there are two issues, there are four possible types of rms as dened
by the cost of adopting a label. Denote these types by ll, lh, hl, and hh, where the rst
index is the cost (either low or high) of addressing issue 1 and the second index is the cost of
addressing issue 2. For example, a rm of type lh nds it low cost to deliver good behavior
on issue 1 in isolation, high cost on issue 2 in isolation. We denote by P () the probability
that the rm is of type  and, without loss of generality, assume P (lh)  P (hl). Generally,
it will be the case that P (lh) > P (hl).
Letting C(L) be the cost of complying with a label L for a rm of type , the cost of







9We ignore altogether the important issue of NGO credibility. An NGO has a direct inter-
est in maintaining a good reputation and therefore a credible label (see Heyes and Maxwell 2004;
Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of Standards and Certication 2012; Duo et al.
2013; Auld 2014). While an NGO label may not be perfectly credible, it is typically more credible than di-
rect claims by rms (Bartley, 2011, p. 441). Credibility is a standard assumption in models of label design
(Heyes and Maxwell, 2004; Bottega and De Freitas, 2009; Fischer and Lyon, 2014) and certication more
generally (Lerner and Tirole, 2006). Dranove and Jin (2010) provide an excellent survey of related issues.
These issues are important but not the focus of our analysis here.
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The cost of good behavior on both issues is the sum of good behavior for each issue in
isolation, plus a term that captures (dis-)economies of scope. Complying with a wide label
costs a rm of type 
C(L12) = C(L1) + C(L2) + ;  2 [ 2cl; 2   2cl]:
Here,  is a measure of economies or dis-economies of scope in pro-social behavior. That
 does not depend on a rm's type is motivated by notion that (dis-)economies of scope
depend primarily on the nature of the social issues, not the rm. While rms may dier
in their unit cost for addressing any particular issue, what matters for economies of scope
are the issues themselves. In this sense  is rightfully a function of the issue space, such
that dierent issue spaces give dierent s, and restrictions on  should be interpreted as
restrictions on the underlying issues in I. The bounds on  ensure that (a) economies of
scope are never so large that a rm faces negative costs to addressing the issues as a pair
and (b) at least some rms can adopt a wide label without net loss.
The need to recognize the potential for economies and dis-economies of scope once we
move to a certication setting which is multi-dimensional is important, and it is not dicult
to think of cases that go either way. It may be that a rm can remove discharge of one
pollutant by switching to some substitute pollutant, in which case removing discharges of
one in isolation is cheap, but both at the same time would be expensive ( > 0). Conversely,
reducing one sort of environmental impact might require retooling of a factory, and once
operations are suspended to make the adjustments the marginal cost of making further
adjustments to address other issues at the same time is reduced ( < 0).
Firms are prot-maximizing and so adopt the label(s) from the available set that gener-
ates the greatest prot (or no label at all)|a rm of type  picks a label L from those on
oer to maximize (L) C(L). To break ties we assume that if a rm is indierent between
a label L 2 L and no label, the rm chooses L and if a rm is indierent between a narrow
10
label and wide label, it chooses the wide. This amounts to saying that if it has zero eect
on prot, a rm will err on the side of good behavior not bad.10
To keep the problem interesting we focus on cases in which  2 (cl; ch) and cl + ch < 2,
so that 2   cl   ch 2 (0;    cl). This is necessary and sucient to generate a trade-o
for an NGO between the scope of a label and its adoption by rms, at least when  is not
too large in absolute value. With this assumption, type lh and hl rms nd a wide label
protable, and hence will adopt it if it turns out to be the only label available. But these
rms would prefer a narrow label to a wide label if available (for example, the rm in the
simple numerical example sketched in the introduction). The implications of relaxing this
assumption are explored in the following sections as  varies.
Finally, when examining welfare we assume that b  ch: pro-social behavior from the rm
is always welfare-desirable. This rules out the possibility that a labeling scheme is inecient
because the issue to which it relates is not one that society wishes to be addressed. Coupled
with our previous assumptions, this implies that b > , so that consumers' willingness to pay
for a labeled product does not exceed the external benet generated from complying with the
requirements of the label. This means that  is some fraction of b, which is sensible.11 When
examining welfare, we include  in the social welfare function as this represents consumer
surplus that rms are able to appropriate by adopting a label. From society's point of view,
the social benet of good behavior is the external benet B plus the private benet .12
10This can come about from, say, the possibility that better social performance by a rm helps to prevent
tougher regulation in the future.
11 must be some fraction  2 (cl=b; 1) of b; the lower bound on  simply ensures that  > cl. Practically,
this means that  cannot be too small a fraction of b, for then no rm types would nd adopting a label
protable and there is no point in studying such labels.
12Consumers' private benet from purchasing a labeled good could come from higher quality associated
with the rm's pro-social behavior, such as with organic food, or from some behavioral motivation, such as
`warm-glow' altruism. While we do not distinguish between these dierent cases in our welfare analysis, our
main results are robust to including only a fraction of  in social welfare.
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2.3 NGOs
We formalize competition between two NGOs as a sequential label design game. NGO i
(incumbent) moves rst by designing a label and NGO e (entrant) moves second, deciding to
enter|and if so designing its label|or stay out.13 Denote by Li the label oered by NGO
i and Le the label oered by NGO e.
In order to simplify the model and focus on the main results of the paper, assume that
NGOs cannot oer identical labels, consistent with the idea that labelers go to considerable
eort to dierentiate their labels.14 There are a variety of ways to motivate this assumption.
It could stem from consumer confusion over labels, such that NGOs oering identical labels
make it dicult for consumers to distinguish the labels, reducing a rm's incentive to adopt
a label (Harbaugh et al., 2011). It could also come from the sequential nature of the game,
with the incumbent developing `brand' awareness for its label rst, so that a rm is more
likely to bear the incumbent's label if an entrant oers the same label as the incumbent.
The objective of an NGO is to design its labeling scheme to maximize the social value
of the good behavior done by rms that adopt its label. We refer to such an NGO as being
impact-motivated. Letting i be the collection of rm types that adopt label Li when label
Le is also on oer, the problem for NGO i is
max
Li2L




with the problem for NGO e dened analogously, should entry occur. F is a xed cost of
setting up and operating a labeling scheme. An NGO can always choose to not set up a
13This structure for competition is motivated by the observation that `for labeling programs early choices
about policy scope and regulatory domain. . . are expected to factor in explaining whether and in what form
new entrants will emerge' (Auld, 2014, p. 50). In other words, the strategic importance of scope in the
context of label design comes about from the incentives it creates for NGOs who might subsequently be
starting up labeling schemes.
14This is a fairly standard assumption for models of label design (e.g., Fischer and Lyon, 2014;
Li and v'ant Veld, 2015). Relaxing this assumption does not disturb the central results of the paper, al-
though it makes stating propositions more dicult and requires introducing additional notation|the key
insights of the model do not depend on this assumption. Any equilibria in which both NGOs oer the same
label are necessarily inecient as there is a duplication of xed costs (introduced below).
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label, denoted by L = ;, earning a payo of zero.
There is no explicit modeling of costs associated with certication/monitoring. These
costs could be borne entirely on rms through C, or benet B could be treated as being
net of any costs of certication. Similarly, the xed cost F need not represent a nancial
outlay but can be an opportunity cost associated with the time of the social entrepreneurs.15
NGOs may also face economies (or dis-economies) of scope when certifying a rm over
multiple issues. It may be easier to certify a rm's behavior with respect to an issue if it
is already certied for another issue. If rms bear the entire cost of certication, then the
economies of scope parameter  may be (partially) a reection of certiers' economies of
scope in certication.
That an NGO is only concerned with the impact generated by its label corresponds to
the notion of `impact philanthropy' (Duncan, 2004) and is fairly standard in models of NGOs
(e.g., Aldashev and Verdier, 2010); Scharf (2014, p. 50) further motivates such an assump-
tion, citing impure altruism on the part of social entrepreneurs. (See Heyes and Maxwell
(2004), Bottega and De Freitas (2009), Fischer and Lyon (2014), and Li and v'ant Veld (2015)
for examples where a similar objective is used in the context of label design.) The role of the
assumption of an impact motivated NGO will become more apparent in the following section
when there are multiple, competing NGOs. A softer variant of this assumption, under which
the main qualitative results of the paper would be sustained, would be if each NGO valued
the impact of other NGOs, but tended to weigh more heavily those directly attributable to
its own programs.
Total social surplus from a pair of labeling schemes (Li; Le) is simply the external benet
associated with addressing social issues in Li and Le, less the cost associated with addressing
these issues, plus consumers' willingness to pay for labeled products (equivalently, rms'
increase in prot from acting in a socially-responsible way). Letting i be the set of rm
types that adopt label i and e be the set of rm types that adopt label e, this can be
15The source of an NGO's funding is also left unspecied; it is standard in the literature to regard NGOs






[B(Li)  C(Li) + (Li)]P () +
X
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2.4 Timing
As already mentioned, competition between labelers takes the form of a sequential game in
which NGO i (incumbent) moves rst, followed by NGO e (entrant). We will demonstrate
later that the main results are robust to allowing for more than one potential entrant. Firms
move last, choosing whether or not to adopt one (or more) of the labels on oer from the set
of labels and sell their output to consumers. In all cases we solve backwards for sub-game
perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE).
3 Competing Labeling Schemes
3.1 A Focal Case ( = 0)
As a special case, consider  = 0 so that there are no economies or dis-economies of scope
when addressing multiple social issues. This case embodies the avor of the more general
analysis with a minimum of fuss and makes for a simpler presentation and statement of
results|the next section relaxes this restriction.
In general, an NGO must take account of how the design of its label will inuence rms'
decision to adopt it relative to competing labeling schemes (or no label at all). For the
moment, however, we consider the incentives facing a single NGO which operates without
the need to consider competition from other NGOs|the NGO is analogous to a statutory
monopolist in the industrial organization literature. This provides a benchmark against
which the competitive outcome can be compared.
Restricting attention to settings in which a monopoly NGO nds it worthwhile to launch
at least a narrow label (i.e., P (ll) +P (lh)  F=b), if the NGO launches L1 then only rms
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of type ll and lh adopt the label, whereas if the NGO launches L2, only rms of type ll
and hl adopt it. By our convention there are more lh-types than hl-types so an NGO will
never wish to oer L2. If the NGO launches L12, however, then all rm types except hh
adopt the label; even though a type lh or hl rm does not nd it protable to address one
of the two issues demanded by the label, it is still protable overall to adopt the wide label.
As such, a monopoly NGO will launch a wide label when there are no (dis-)economies of
scope.
In order to make the monopoly NGO case a useful benchmark, the following lemma
establishes that a single wide label is ecient (among the set of possible labels L) when
there can be multiple NGOs oering labels.
Lemma 1. When there are no economies or dis-economies of scope between pro-social be-
haviors, the label oered by a monopoly NGO is welfare-ecient (i.e., (Li; Le) = (L12; ;) is
ecient when  = 0).
Intuitively, since producing social benet is socially desirable (recall that b  ch by
assumption), a social planner would like to design a label that induces as much pro-social
behavior from rms as possible and not give rms the opportunity to choose a label that
produces lower social impact, hence a single wide label. Since the monopoly NGO faces no
competition for rms to adopt its label, and a wide label produces maximal social impact,
the monopoly NGO designs an ecient label.
Having established the benchmark case when there is no competition, we now move to
the competitive case. In looking at the outcome of a competitive equilibrium there are three
possible types of equilibria that can emerge, depending on the proportion of rm types. In
each case what matters is the number of leveraged rms|those that nd adopting a wide
label protable, but would prefer a narrow label (i.e., type lh and hl rms). These rms
will adopt a wide label if it is the only one on oer, but would prefer a narrow label focused
on the behavior which they nd cheapest. It is these leveraged rms that provide a strategic
link between the label of the incumbent and the actions of the entrant. We consider each of
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these three types of equilibria in turn, showing that competition results in an inecient set
of labels.
Entry Deterrence
The rst possibility is that leveraged rms are decisive in determining the sort of label
an NGO will design|if an incumbent does not design a label to appease these rms, an
entrant can design a more attractive label, displacing altogether the label of the incumbent.
Anticipating this the incumbent designs a narrow label to deter entry. This outcome hinges
on their being a sucient proportion of these leveraged rms; the entrant will only launch
a narrow scheme if the number of rms that adopt its label is sucient to justify the xed
cost of establishing the scheme.
Proposition 1 (Inecient deterred entry). If enough rms nd it cheaper to engage in one
particular pro-social behavior than the other, then the incumbent NGO designs a narrow
label focused on that behavior. In so doing it deters entry of another NGO. Concretely, if
P (lh)  F=b and P (ll)+P (hl) < F=(2b) then (Li ; Le) = (L1; ;) in the unique SPNE. The
set of labels in equilibrium is welfare-inecient.
The reason that competition does not produce an ecient outcome is that the incumbent
NGO nds it protable to choose Li = L1 and block entry by a narrow competitor. (Recall
from lemma 1 that the wide label is the ecient one.) The welfare-motivated planner would
rather it operated a wide label, as it would if there were no threat of competition, and
that the entrant stayed out. While there are still the same number of leveraged rms if a
monopoly NGO launches a wide label, because there is no threat of competition these rms
do not inuence a monopoly's choice of label.
Such a reaction on the part of the incumbent NGO has the avor of a contestable market
(Baumol et al., 1982). Counter to the case of a contestable market, however, contestability in
labeling leads to welfare ineciency. This corresponds to the counter-intuitive role of market
demand for labels identied by Auld (2014), where labelers face the `top-down challenge of
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courting potential supporters and preventing entry by competing programs' (Auld, 2014,
p. 13). However, this contestability type story is not the only way in which competition
between NGOs can generate inecient results, which leads to the second possibility.
Accommodation
Consider a setting in which leveraged rms still constitute a large fraction of rm types, but
there is greater heterogeneity among these rms in terms of preferred behavior (that is, which
pro-social behavior respective rms nd cheaper to engage in). This means that there are
more type hl rms relative to lh rms than above (in proposition 1). While heterogeneity
means that leveraged rms are no longer decisive, the large number of leveraged rms still
makes entry attractive.
Proposition 2 (Inecient accommodated entry). If enough rms nd it cheaper to engage
in one pro-social behavior than the other, but vary in which behavior is cheaper, then the
incumbent NGO accommodates entry. In equilibrium two labels operate, one narrow and one
wide. Concretely, if P (lh)  F=b and P (ll)+P (hl)  P (lh)=2 then (Li ; Le) = (L12; L1) in
the unique SPNE. Similarly, if P (ll)+P (hl) 2 [F=(2b); P (lh)=2) then (Li ; Le) = (L1; L12).
The set of labels in equilibrium is welfare-inecient.
This result serves to emphasize the general nature of the ineciency that comes from
competition between NGOs: leveraging of rms. For instance, if the incumbent NGO chooses
the ecient (wide) label, some rms (the type lh rms) are leveraged, causing them to adopt
a socially inecient, narrow label if oered by the entrant. Provided there are enough such
rms, the entrant does indeed enter with such a narrow label. Comparing again with the
benchmark of a monopoly NGO, even if the incumbent decides to oers the (ecient) wide
label, a competitor can oer a narrow label that appeals to certain rms and dilute the social
impact of the wide label.
17
Blockaded Entry
The nal possibility is that the number of leveraged rms is so low that it does not inuence
the label design decision of the incumbent NGO. In this case there is no meaningful strategic
interaction between the NGOs, delivering the following.
Proposition 3 (Ecient blockaded entry). If an insucient fraction of rms prefer ad-
dressing only one issue then the incumbent NGO designs a wide label and entry is blockaded.
The incumbent acts as a monopolist insulated from the threat of competition. Concretely, if




e) = (L12; ;) in the unique SPNE. The set of labels in equilibrium
is welfare-ecient.
In eect, then, whenever there is meaningful strategic inter-dependence between the
NGOs, the result is a socially-inecient set of labeling schemes. Only in this last case do the
NGOs make non-cooperative label design choices that deliver the suite of labeling schemes
that a welfare-motivated planner would wish to see. But this occurs precisely because entry
is blockaded and the incumbent can act as a monopolist. Taken together, propositions 1 to
3 imply that competition results in an inecient set of labels.
Figure 2 illustrates how the above three propositions partition the space of rm types.
Fixing the number of type hh rms, that never adopt a label anyways, the share of each rm
type can be represented on the surface of a tetrahedron with vertices of length 1 P (hh), and
this surface can be partitioned to illustrate where in the space of rm types each equilibrium
will occur. (Recall that P (lh)  P (hl) by assumption, so that the type space is `cut in
half', hence the dashed lines in the gure; since types lh and hl are symmetric, this is
without loss of generality.) Moving from the top of the type space to the bottom moves
the equilibrium from one in which there is only a narrow label, to one in which there is
a narrow label and a wide label, and nally to one in which there is only a wide label.
Simultaneously, the equilibrium moves from one in which entry is deterred, to one in which
entry is accommodated, and nally to one in which entry is blockaded.16
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Figure 2: Partition of the type space according to the propositions. Top region (lines)
corresponds to proposition 1; middle region (dots) corresponds to proposition 2; bottom
region (hatched) corresponds to proposition 3. Dashed line in the dotted region separated
the two cases in proposition 2.
Underlying the logic in both propositions 1 and 2 is the ability of the entrant to induce
defection from leveraged (actually or prospectively) rms. In this way the entrant comes to
act in the interest of rms in the sense that the scheme operated by the entrant NGO is
identical to that which would be run by an industry certier (should one exists) motivated
by maximizing industry prots, as in Fischer and Lyon (2014).
Remark 1. When the entrant NGO chooses to operate a labeling scheme, this scheme is
indistinguishable from an industry-operated label.
The above remark gives rise to an interesting interpretation of an entering NGO. The
scheme of the entrant can be thought of as having been `started by' leveraged rms (or by the
NGO on behalf of those rms) in response to an incumbent NGO's label. This is consistent
with the idea that `NGOs, companies, and auditors, among others, have two options: they
between costs for the dierent types of issues; that is, holding P (hl) xed, it becomes more likely that
P (ll) + P (hh)  P (lh) + P (hl). In this way, when there is a positive correlation in costs between issues,
it is more likely that entry is blockaded, whereas with a negative correlation it is more likely that entry is
either deterred or accommodated.
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can participate in or support an existing program, or they can form a new program to
complement or compete with existing programs.' (Auld, 2014, p. 50).
Remark 1 allows us to compare proposition 2 with the results in Fischer and Lyon (2014),
where an industry group and a competing environmental NGO strategically design the strin-
gency of their labels. Compared to a setting in which labelers compete on the stringency
of their label, competition in the scope of labels leads to an unambiguous decrease in rms'
social performance and welfare. Intuitively, by acting in the interests of rms, a competi-
tor enables leveraged rms to select a less impacful (i.e., narrow) label that they nonethe-
less nd more protable, to the detriment of all rms' social conduct. By contrast, in
Fischer and Lyon (2014) competition with an industry group can lead more rms to adopt
a label, producing greater social impact and welfare. Similar comments apply to the work
by Li and v'ant Veld (2015), where competition between an NGO and industry group label
can improve welfare.
The above results also relate to the paper by Heyes and Martin (2017). With competing
NGOs (competing on the stringency of their labels), entry has the eect of improving welfare
by helping to mitigate a race to the top in labels' standards. In contrast, when labelers
compete in scope the eect is reversed, and even the threat of competition leads to a reduction
in welfare compared to a monopoly NGO.
While only the case of a single entrant has been considered, it is straightforward to
incorporate two entrants in the model. Restricting attention to a single entrant minimizes
the number of cases to consider and delivers the essential results and intuition, as well as
giving the best chance for NGOs to deliver an ecient outcome. Having two entrants would
only aect proposition 2, adding cases in which there is one wide labels and two narrow
labels, and two narrow labels. The normative results of this section are unchanged, as these
additional equilibria are inecient.
Before moving on and considering the implications of (dis-)economies of scope in ad-
dressing issues, it is useful to reect on how the model helps to explain the structure of the
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labeling market for sheries and forestry. As noted in Auld (2014), the Marine Stewardship
Council (MSC) was the incumbent certier for wild catch sheries until the Friends of the
Sea (FoS) emerged to certify both wild catch and aquaculture, the only label of its kind. In
the context of our model, this corresponds to the equilibrium in proposition 2 in which the
incumbent oers a narrow label, accommodating an entrant that oers a wide label. Our
model can explain this structure in terms of how costly sheries nd addressing environmen-
tal issues with respect to wild catch and aquaculture, with the MSC oering a narrow label
because of the preponderance of sheries that nd addressing issues associated with wild
catch easier than with aquaculture. However, this leaves a gap in the incumbent's coverage,
leaving room for an entrant to come in with a wide label. While the MSC would like to
deter entry by designing a label that appeals to sheries that would be leveraged by a wide
label, there are enough sheries interested in addressing issues associated with aquaculture
to allows the FoS to enter and setup a wide label.
For forestry, the Forest Stewardship Council initially set up a broad, international label,
focused on the environmental implications of forestry practices. In response to this label,
however, the industry standard SFI emerged in the US to focus on particular domestic issues
(Turcotte et al., 2012). As with sheries, proposition 2 applies in this case, although now it
is the incumbent NGO oering a wide label, with an industry label emerging in response.
Our model attributes this strategy on the part of the entrant to the presence of leveraged
rms|when the incumbent bundles an issue into its wide label that a sucient proposition
of rms nd onerous to comply with, these rms may collectively start their own, narrow
label.
3.2 The General Case ( 6= 0)
The  = 0 case provided most of the insight that we deliver in this paper, in particular the
more or less generic result that allowing for competition among NGOs generates ineciency
in the market for labeling services. This causes us to be less optimistic about the welfare
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Figure 3: Economies or dis-economies of scope.
gains that should be expected from NGO-operated labels than is the extant literature.
In this section we present the general case, allowing for the possibility of economies or
dis-economies of scope between pro-social activities. While many of the earlier results are
sustained, the  6= 0 case does generate an additional set of possibilities. In particular,
suciently pronounced dis-economies of scope introduces the possibility that competition,
or even just the threat of competition, can be good for welfare. As such our focus is on how
the equilibria in proposition 1 to 3 change as a result of introducing (dis-)economies of scope,
rather than an exhaustive analysis of all equilibria as in the previous section.
In examining competition generally, there are several cases to consider, depending on
(dis-)economies of scope: (1)  2 (   cl; 2   2cl], (2)  2 (2   cl   ch;    cl], (3)
 2 (   ch; 2   cl   ch], (4)  2 (2   2ch;    ch], and (5)  2 [ 2cl; 2   2ch]. See gure
3.
Most of these we can ignore, however. For case (3) the analysis is the same as when
 = 0, and we do not repeat it here. As before, the wide label oered by a monopoly NGO
is ecient and so all the normative analysis for case (3) is the same as when  = 0.17 Cases
(2), (4), and (5) are of little interest because they imply no meaningful strategic interaction
between the NGOs|there are no leveraged rms in any of these cases. The presence of
economies of scope simply allows for more general conditions under which entry is blockaded
and an ecient suite of labels emerge. For cases (4) and (5), proposition 3 can be extended
as follows.
Proposition 4 (Ecient blockaded entry). If there are sucient economies of scope between
17The proof of lemma 1 is identical.
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the pro-social behaviors, the incumbent NGO designs a wide label which blockades entry.
Concretely, for cases (4) and (5) (Li ; L

e) = (L12; ;) in the unique SPNE. The set of labels
in equilibrium is welfare-ecient.
This proposition is intuitive: with suciently pronounced economies of scope between
behaviors, no rm will nd it attractive to adopt a narrow label and so miss out on exploiting
economies of scope. The incumbent NGO can launch a wide label with no threat of entry of
a competing labeling scheme. This label achieves the same social impact as in the case with
no economies of scope, and does so at lower cost to society, making it ecient. Consistent
with the analysis so far, a single NGO insulated from competitive forces delivers the ecient
outcome.
While all the conclusions of the  = 0 case continue to hold for a range of dis-economies
of scope, suciently large dis-economies can lead to new types of equilibria and, signicantly
for us, the possibility that competition between NGOs is welfare-enhancing.
In case (1),  is negative and large enough that no rm would prefer the wide label.
Paralleling lemma 1, the following lemma establishes the kind of label that a monopoly
NGO would design and gives us a benchmark for competition.
Lemma 2. For case (1), a monopoly NGO designs a narrow label L1 if and only if P (ll) <
P (lh), otherwise it oers a wide label. If the NGO designs a narrow label, it produces greater
surplus than a wide label, but not vice versa.
Compared to the previous cases considered, with sucient dis-economies of scope a
monopoly NGO may design a narrow label. If the NGO does design a narrow label, it
is necessarily more ecient than a wide label. Dis-economies of scope, however, introduces
the possibility that the monopoly NGO may instead wish to oer a wide label, even though
this label is inecient. Intuitively, this ineciency can occur because an NGO does not
internalize the cost rms pay for complying with the requirements of the label. With a wide
label and large dis-economies of scope, these costs can be large, and while a narrow label
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produces less social benet, it is nonetheless better for society. In such a setting competition
between labelers can lead to a socially more desirable outcome by causing NGOs to oer
narrow labels.
Considering competing labelers, entry can be either deterred or accommodated as before,
and the interpretation of when these cases arises is the same as in propositions 1 and 2.
What's new, however, is that with sucient dis-economies of scope it can be that only
narrow labels emerge in equilibrium.
Proposition 5 (Narrow labels). Let there be dis-economies of scope between the pro-social
behaviors captured by  2 (   cl; 2   2cl]. If P (ll) + P (hl) < F=b then (Li ; Le) = (L1; ;)
in the unique SPNE and if P (ll) + P (hl)  F=b then (Li ; Le) = (L1; L2) in the unique
SPNE.
The welfare properties of these outcomes are less straightforward to discern than in earlier
cases. Recall, however, that with sucient dis-economies of scope a monopoly NGO may not
design an ecient label, introducing the possibility that competitive forces may induce NGOs
to design ecient labels. Comparing competitive NGOs with a monopoly NGO, if (and only
if) P (ll)  P (lh) then a monopoly NGO will choose the wide label L12. However, it may
not be the case that s(L1) > s(L12), with competition providing a better outcome socially
if and only if this inequality is satised. Intuitively, ll-type rms will adopt a wide label if
it is the only scheme available, but dis-economies of scope render such a label inecient. In
particular, in this case the threat of entry by a competing labeling scheme may be sucient
to produce an ecient outcome. Sucient conditions for this are summarized as follows.
Proposition 6 (Welfare-improving preemption). Given the conditions of proposition 5,
s(L1; ;) > s(L12; ;) if [ cl+b]P (lh) > bP (ll) so that competition between labeling schemes
increases welfare. In words, if P (ll)   P (lh) is positive but not `too large' the incumbent
NGO designs a narrow label to preempt entry of a competing scheme. This produces greater
welfare than the outcome under a monopoly NGO.
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The existence of suciently pronounced dis-economies of scope also generates the possi-
bility of complementary (or non-overlapping) labels. Provided the cost of operating a label
is not excessive, complementary labels can also improve welfare. This is summarized as
follows.
Proposition 7 (Welfare-improving accommodation). Given the conditions of proposition 5,
s(L1; L2) > maxfs(L12; ;); s(L1; ;)g if [  cl+ b][P (ll)+P (hl)] > F . In words, if the xed
costs of operating a labeling scheme are suciently small, the incumbent NGO accommodates
entry with the entrant choosing a complementary label. This produces greater welfare than
the outcome under a monopoly NGO.
In contrast to the previous analysis when dis-economies of scope were either small or
non-existent, competition between labelers can lead to an increase in welfare with large
dis-economies of scope.
3.3 Discussion
As mentioned in the introduction, since our model explicitly recognizes both the scope of
labels and entry of certiers, the results of our model can cast some light on the recent
phenomena of label proliferation and fragmentation.
Provided dis-economies of scope in addressing issues are not too large, the entry of new
certiers is inecient, barring some pre-existing ineciency in addressing issues (propositions
1 and 2). Entry has the eect of encouraging narrow labels that do not demand enough from
rms, fragmenting the set of labels rms can adopt. This means that proliferation of labels
is inecient when NGOs choose the scope of their labels. This contrasts with existing
literature, where proliferation of labels improves welfare when NGOs choose the stringency
of their labels (Heyes and Martin, 2017). While the notion that proliferation of labels is
inecient is not new, in our setting it comes about from the contestability of labels, rather
than a race-to-the-bottom in the stringency of labels (e.g., Bartley, 2011; Auld, 2014) or
consumer confusion over labels (Harbaugh et al., 2011).
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The mechanism underpinning this fragmentation is that rms can be leveraged. Hetero-
geneity in how costly rms nd engaging in pro-social behaviors of dierent types allows for
an entering NGO to compete by oering a `predatory' label. In this way natural barriers
to entry, such as economies of scope for rms or a particular distribution of rm types,
can serve to mitigate the ineciency generated by inter-NGO competition and induce an
ecient suite of labels. Necessary for (the threat of) competition to produce a superior out-
come compared to a monopoly NGO is that there are suciently pronounced dis-economies
of scope in addressing issues (proposition 5).
The results of the model also point to the possible emergence of multiple labels applied
to the same issue, which is inecient. The conception of fragmentation as the scope of indi-
vidual labels becoming narrow, and this representing a potential impediment for adoption by
rms (Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of Standards and Certication,
2012, pp. 47, 51), is conrmed in proposition 2. Recall, the coexistence of a wide and nar-
row label in equilibrium induces some rms (the lh types) to make a welfare-inecient
label choice. If there is overlap in the scope of labels because of label fragmentation, then
some rms will adopt a label with a narrower scope and engage in less pro-social behavior
than they otherwise would. As such the model provides analytic support for the common
practitioner view that label fragmentation is undesirable.18
It is important to point out, however, that proliferation and fragmentation of labels are
not the only reasons why labels can be inecient. As seen in proposition 1, contestability
and the threat of entry is sucient to produce an inecient outcome.
18It is worth emphasizing that the possibility of label confusion is not a feature of the model. The case
against the growth in the number of schemes is sometimes based on the possible confusion that would be
induced (Steering Committee of the State-of-Knowledge Assessment of Standards and Certication, 2012,
pp. 47, 49-51, 105). Harbaugh et al. (2011) provide useful insights into ineciency due to such confusion.
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4 Conclusions
NGO-operated environmental and social labeling schemes are now a key feature of the land-
scape within which many rms operate. All sorts of stakeholders are willing to reward a rm
that goes about its business in a `responsible' way, provided that this behavior is certied.
We provide the rst formal analysis of the incentives facing an NGO in designing the scope
of its labeling scheme in a setting in which it competes with other NGOs for adoptions and
impact. This allows us to cast light on recent practitioner debates about proliferation and
fragmentation in the market for certication.
While we do not restate the results of our analysis here, a consistent theme is that we
should not expect|except in quite particular circumstances|NGOs to deliver a desirable
suite of labeling schemes. In a setting in which prospective certiers can enter and set up a
label, competition, actual or anticipated, between schemes serves to make things worse. This




Proof of lemma 1. It suces to show that s(L12; ;) > s(L12; L1)  s(L1; L2). Surplus from
(Li; Le) = (L12; L1) is
2[ + b][P (ll) + P (hl)]  [2cl + ]P (ll)  [cl + ch + ]P (hl) + [   cl + b]P (lh)  2F:
It follows that s(L12; L1)  s(L12; ;) if and only if
  F
P (lh)




+    ch + b > 2   cl   ch
if b   so that any  that satises (1) must be (strictly) greater than 2   cl   ch  0.
Surplus from (Li; Le) = (L1; L2) is
[ + b  cl][2P (ll) + P (lh) + P (hl)]  2F:
It follows that s(L12; L1) > s(L1; L2) if and only if
[b+    cl   ]P (lh) + [b+    ch   ]P (hl)  0: (2)
Since   2   cl   ch, (2) is true if b  .
Proof of proposition 1. The assumptions in the proposition imply that b[P (ll)+P (lh)]  F
and 2b[P (ll) + P (hl)] < F . NGO i will never play Li = L2 since P (lh) > P (hl) (i.e.,
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Li = L2 is dominated by Li = L12). If i plays Li = L12, then e plays Le = L1 so that
vi(Li; Le) = 2b[P (ll) + P (hl)]  F < 0
and
ve(Li; Le) = bP (lh)  F  0:
If i plays Li = L1, then e plays Le = ; so that
vi(Li; Le) = b[P (ll) + P (lh)]  F  0:
The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium thus has (Li ; L

e) = (L1; ;).
Proof of proposition 2. First consider 2b[P (ll) + P (hl)]  F  bP (lh)  F  0. As before,
Li = L2 is a dominated strategy for i. If i plays Li = L1, then e plays Le = L12 so that
vi(Li; Le) = bP (lh)  F  0
and
ve(Li; Le) = 2b [P (ll) + P (hl)]  F  0:
If i plays Li = L12 then e plays Le = L1 so that
vi(Li; Le) = 2b[P (ll) + P (hl)]  F  bP (lh)  F
and
ve(Li; Le) = bP (lh)  F  0:
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As such the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium has (Li ; L

e) = (L12; L1). Similarly, if 0 
2b [P (ll) + P (hl)]   F < bP (lh)   F , then (Li ; Le) = (L1; L12) in the sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium.
Proof of proposition 3. If i plays Li = L12, then e plays Le = ; so that
vi(Li; Le) = 2b[P (ll) + P (lh) + P (hl)]  F:
The maximum payo i can get from playing Li = L1 is
vi(Li; Le) = b[P (ll) + P (lh)]  F
and so (Li ; L

e) = (L12; ;) in the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Remark 1. If the incumbent oers L12, an entrant maximizes industry prot by
oering L1; if the incumbent oers L1, an entrant maximizes industry prot by oering
L12.
Proof of Proposition 4. For cases (4) and (5), proof of the equilibrium strategy is trivial;
eciency follows from lemma 1.
Proof of lemma 2. For case (1), it is straightforward to show that L = L1 if and only if
P (ll) < P (lh). Now the wide label is ecient if and only if
P (ll)  P (lh)
P (ll)
[   cl + b]  :
If L = L1 then P (ll) < P (lh) so that
P (ll)  P (lh)
P (ll)
[   cl + b] < 0;
but  > 0 for case (1) and so L = L1 is ecient.
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then e plays Le = ; and if P (hl)  Fb   P (ll) then e plays Le = L2.
For (Li; Le) = (L1; ;), s(L1; ;)  s(L12; ;) if and only if
[   cl + b][P (ll)  P (lh)]  P (ll);
which need not be true generally. For (Li; Le) = (L1; L2), s(L1; L2)  s(L12; ;) if and only if
F   [   cl + b][P (lh) + P (hl)]  P (ll)
which again need not be generally true.
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